Supreme court/No Evidence Could Be Led Beyond…
No Evidence Could Be Led Beyond Pleadings : Supreme Court
5 Mar 2024
The Supreme Court observed that the evidence which was not a part of the pleadings couldn’t be led in the trial. “There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that no evidence could be led beyond pleadings. It is not a case in which there was any error in the pleadings and the parties knowing their case fully well had led evidence to enable the Court to deal with that evidence. In the…
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‘Ghee’ A ‘Product Of Livestock’ : Supreme Court Dismisses Challenge To 1994 Andhra Pradesh Notification
Debby Jain
6 Mar 2024 9:23 PM
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In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court held “ghee” to be a “product of livestock” for the purposes of regulation of its purchase and sale in all notified market areas of Andhra Pradesh (AP).
“The argument that “ghee” is not a product of livestock is baseless, and bereft of any logic…Livestock has been defined under Section 2(v) of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966, where Cows and buffalos are the livestock. Undisputedly, “ghee” is a product of milk which is a product of the livestock”, said the Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and SVN Bhatti.
The genesis of the case lay in a 1994 government notification, which inter-alia notified “ghee” as one of the products of livestock, for the purpose of regulation of its purchase and sale in the notified market areas of AP.
This notification was challenged by the appellants (producers of livestock products) before the AP High Court on two grounds. First, that “ghee” was not a “product of livestock” and therefore could not be regulated and notified; second, that the notification was bad in law as procedure laid down under Section 3 of the Act (involving publishing of a draft notification and calling of objections) was not followed.
A Full Bench of the AP High Court ruled against the appellants and upheld the notification. It opined that all animal husbandry products fall within the meaning of ‘products of livestock’ as defined under Section 2 (xv) of the Act.
The majority decision of the High Court further held that the inclusion of “ghee” as a livestock product could not be faulted merely because it was derived from another dairy product. It also noted that prior publication of draft 1994 notification was not required, as the same was under Section 4 of the Act and not Section 3.
In appeal, the matter came before the Supreme Court, which framed and dealt with the following two questions:
(i) whether “ghee” is a “product of livestock” under the provisions of the 1966 Act, and
(ii) whether the 1994 notification complied with the provisions of the Act.
On the first issue, the Court concurred with the High Court’s reasoning that even though ‘Ghee’ is derived out of ‘milk’ by undergoing a process, it remains a product of livestock for the purposes of the Act and payment of “market fee”.
On the second issue, it declared that there was nothing wrong in the 1994 notification, as it was issued under Section 4 and not Section 3.
“What has to be done under Section 3 is a onetime measure where the Government notifies an area where purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock can be made. This is a one-time exercise. What happens under Section 4 of the Act is that the Govt. declares the ‘notified market area’ in resp